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BOGDAN LISSOVOLIK AND YAROSLAV LISSOVOLIK*
With China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, Russia is by far that organization’s
most prominent nonmember. This paper applies the gravity model to gauge whether
this “outsider” status has been affecting Russia’s export structure. On the basis of
cross-section and panel regressions for 1995–2002, we find that Russian exports
to WTO members have fallen short of the model’s predictions. The paper discusses
possible explanations of this result, including Russia’s exclusion from various
WTO procedures, although own-export restrictions could have a similar effect.
The model points to Russia’s further trade reorientation toward WTO members
after a putative accession. Our results also prompt some ideas that may clarify
the recent empirical controversy over the WTO’s overall role in promoting trade.
[JEL F14, F18]
T
he role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in international trade has
recently come under increased scrutiny. In a provocative study, Rose (2002)
concluded—on the basis of a gravity model—that the effect of the WTO on trade
was insignificant. This result was disputed by several authors.1 In particular,
Subramanian and Wei (2003) employed an augmented specification of the gravity
model to estimate the relationship between trade and WTO membership. These
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authors argued that the organization strongly promotes trade, although with con-
siderable asymmetries across sectors and groups of countries. In particular, WTO
liberalization appears to be more useful to members than to nonmembers, although
the latter also could benefit somewhat from the spillover effect of expanding global
trade. Rose has countered, however, that these asymmetries are not central to the
WTO’s overall role, and thus the debate continues.
This paper uses a gravity model to evaluate the impact of the WTO on the
trade of Russia—currently the largest nonmember. There are several reasons for
the single-country focus. First, it partly gauges the insights of the “multicountry”
gravity models, since these should, to a certain extent, apply to large countries with
reasonably diversified trade flows. Second, it assesses the WTO-related issues from
a national perspective, which is, in practice, a key focus of most policy decisions.
Third, Russia’s case is particularly important because of its size and the fact that
its accession negotiations provide a reference point for some other nonmember
countries (notably in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)) involved in
a similar process. Finally, Russia’s WTO accession has been a very contentious
topic, both in terms of its domestic political economy and with respect to entry
conditions demanded by some WTO members.
Our main conclusion is that the impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on the
structure and possibly the level of trade may be quite significant and could be much
higher than current estimates. As a first step, we find cross-section and panel data
evidence that, on average (after adjusting for the customary gravity model and
country-specific effects), Russia’s exports to the WTO countries underperformed its
exports to other countries in 1995–2002. These results are somewhat surprising in
light of both the general trade-promoting view of the WTO and the overwhelming
casual evidence of Russia’s trade reorientation toward the more advanced developed
and developing countries, all of which are or have recently become WTO members.
As a second step, we explore the possible reasons for this empirical result,
which include (1) Russia’s nonparticipation in WTO procedures, (2) Russia’s own
export restrictions, (3) possible model specification and data caveats, (4) structural
path dependence in Russia’s exports, and (5) Russia’s comparative advantage in
bargaining with WTO nonmembers. The first two factors come out as more plau-
sible and consistent with the stylized facts: It appears that, with WTO accession
(which will relieve trade restrictions), Russia would further reorient its trade in
line with the gravity model. If so, the magnitude of the trade-related benefits from
joining the WTO appears quantitatively large in the long term, although the precise
parameter estimates must be interpreted with caution, given the partial nature of the
model and certain data problems.
Finally, we discuss how our results might help shed some light on the current
empirical controversy over the WTO’s overall role in influencing trade. We con-
clude that, while the WTO exhibits some trade-promoting features, the asymmetry
between members and nonmembers also may constrain trade and may obscure
econometric evidence of the WTO’s role in multilateral models. The reason is that
a large country like Russia may be a local “center of gravity” for some non-WTO
members, and the customary controls of the gravity model do not eliminate this
effect fully in multilateral WTO studies.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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I. Russia’s Evolving Integration into the World Trading System
Trade Developments
After proclaiming independence in late 1991, Russia embarked on a difficult tran-
sition from central planning to a market economy. The key dimension of this tran-
sition has concerned the opening up and integration of Russia’s economy into the
world economy, with the primary focus on trade’s role in unleashing incentives in
line with the fundamental principle of comparative advantage. This process seemed
critical, as much of external trade of the socialist bloc had not been based on mar-
ket principles but reflected priorities imposed by political and ideological factors.
Thus, export and import flows had been heavily concentrated in the former social-
ist economies and involved various forms of explicit or implicit subsidization. The
sudden change in the policy course was exacerbated by the severe economic dis-
location of the early 1990s, with further significant effects on the extent, direction,
and time profile of adjustment in the external trade sector.
Russia experienced large shifts in levels and structure of external trade during
the transition period. In terms of levels, the shock of Soviet disintegration caused a
trade implosion in 1991–92 (see Figure 1); this was followed by a steady rebound
in 1993–2003, except for a brief slippage in 1997–98.
The significant structural changes in Russia’s trade occurred mostly in the early
1990s. The main geographical trend was a reorientation away from the former
socialist economies toward more advanced market economies (see Table 1). Trade
with the former socialist economies contracted very abruptly, as the value of
Russia’s exports to those countries decreased by more than half in 1991 alone.2
2See Granville (1995). However, pre-1994 data on Russia’s trade are highly imperfect for a variety of
reasons, including very weak compilation capacity and distorted valuation.
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Table 1. Geographical Structure of Russia’s Exports in 1990, 1995, and 2002
(In percent of total exports)
1990 1995 2002
Commonwealth of Independent States 64.0 18.5 14.6
European Union . . . 33.6 34.9
Other Former COMECON1 15.5 11.0 10.7
United States . . . 6.6 6.1
China . . . 4.4 6.3
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; Daviddi and Espa (1996) for the 1990 data.
1Refers to Bulgaria, Cuba, former Czechoslovakia, former East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
Table 2. Sectoral Structure of Russia’s Exports in 1995 and 2002
(In percent, current U.S. dollar value terms)
1995 2002
Agricultural products 3.3 2.6
Minerals 42.0 55.2
Chemical industry products 9.9 7.0
Wood, pulp, and paper 5.6 4.6
Textiles 1.5 0.8
Metals and precious stones 26.1 18.6
Machinery and transport equipment 9.9 9.5
Other 1.7 1.7
Source: Goskomstat of Russia.
Since the mid-1990s, however, changes in the geographical composition have not
been very large. In the end, Russia’s exports remained geographically diversified,
at least compared with those of the CIS countries. Thus, the share of Russia’s three
main export markets in total exports was 23 percent in 1995, compared with
between half and two-thirds for other CIS countries (see Elborgh-Woytek, 2003).
In 2001, this figure stood at 22 percent for Russia, compared with a 31–65 percent
range for other CIS countries.
The commodity composition of trade also has changed significantly compared
with that of socialist times, particularly on the export side, with a reduction in
machinery exports accompanying a steady expansion in shipments of energy and,
to a lesser extent, semiprocessed goods (metals and chemicals). For example, the
share of machinery in Russia’s exports to non-CIS countries fell from 18 percent in
1990 to 7 percent in 1993 (Daviddi and Espa, 1996). To some extent, these changes
reflected the expected market-based pressure to downsize low or negative value-
added activities. While there were further changes in the commodity compositionRUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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of exports between 1995 and 2002 (see Table 2), they were much less pronounced
than in the early 1990s.
These trade-related developments appear to have had a sizable impact on the
key macroeconomic and structural dimensions of Russia’s transition. On the macro-
economy, the trade contraction greatly exacerbated the early output decline and
“disorganization” (see Blanchard and Kremer, 1997), while the subsequent start
of trade recovery preceded the stabilization of output (see Figure 2), and that of
the exchange rate, and prices in the mid-1990s. The 1998 currency crisis was in
no small measure triggered by adverse shocks to Russia’s exports, while the post-
1998 recovery relied on the reversal of those shocks in conjunction with the sub-
stantial expansionary impact of the real depreciation of the ruble.3 Regarding
structural issues, trade has not only subjected enterprises to competitive pressures
and world price signals but also helped keep in check barter and other forms of
a noncash economy, which had plagued Russia’s transformation for most of the
1990s.
Despite its largely beneficial effect in terms of market-based adjustment, the
role of foreign trade in Russia’s economy has been constrained by domestic and
external policy decisions. Domestically, the decisions reflected discretionary gov-
ernment interference, with more than occasional administrative actions at federal
and local levels against the principles of free trade. A case in point is various
export restrictions or bans imposed by local governments to protect the supply of
essential products during the 1990s. Another example is federal government deci-
sions to tax or restrict exports of energy products more heavily starting in 1999.
Whatever the merit of some of these steps, they caused concern over policy rever-
sals in the absence of a comprehensive strategy and framework for such decisions.
Externally, the key problem concerned the substantial remaining restrictions on
Russia’s exports by industrialized and some developing countries, which have
mostly affected semiprocessed products such as metals and chemicals. These
policies may explain the evidence that the bulk of trade-related structural change
occurred in the early 1990s but slowed substantially thereafter.
The WTO Entry Debate
Russia’s accession to the WTO has emerged as a key step for further market-
oriented reform (see Lissovolik and Liventsev, 2002).4 On the one hand, this acces-
sion could harmonize Russia’s domestic legislation and practices with those of its
major trading partners. On the other hand, it would remove the main remaining
obstacles to Russia’s exports to WTO members, amplifying the substantial gains
from trade that Russia has already been able to generate. The unused potential for
further trade reorientation is illustrated by the fact that Russia’s exports to the
WTO accounted for “only” about 80 percent of its total exports in 2002 (Figure 3),
3See Owen and Robinson (2003) for an overview of macroeconomic and structural developments in
Russia.
4A short chronology of Russia’s ongoing WTO accession process is provided in Appendix Table A.1.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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compared with the 95 percent share of WTO members in world trade. Further-
more, the share of Russia’s exports to WTO countries that became members of the
organization in 1995 hardly changed in the period 1995–2002, with the growth in
the share of exports directed to all WTO countries largely accounted for by the
increase in WTO membership. However, despite these arguments and the procla-
Figure 3. Share of Russia’s Exports to WTO Countries in Its Total Exports
(In percent)
Figure 2. Growth in Real GDP and Real Exports in 1990–2003
(In percent)
Sources: Goskomstat, and IMF staff.
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Note: the WTO series shows the share of Russia’s exports to all WTO members
in each year, while the WTO-95 series gives the same indicator only for those
countries that were WTO members by the end of 1995. 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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mation of WTO entry as Russia’s key policy priority, the debate on the benefits of
Russia’s membership has become more ambiguous lately, causing substantial delays
in the already protracted accession process.
The uncertainty over Russia’s gains from WTO membership is based on sev-
eral factors. First, the past few years have seen less optimism over the benefits and
prospects of free trade, both around the world (following the well-known events
in Seattle and Cancun) and within Russia. Second, domestic opponents of Russia’s
WTO entry have argued that additional gains from membership would be limited,
since the country already enjoys most favored nation (MFN) status with many
WTO members, and some advanced countries have accorded preferential treatment
to Russia under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Third, there have
been concerns over asymmetric treatment, as Russia’s concessions (in the form of
lower tariffs) on imports and a possible short-term output contraction would far
outweigh any benefits for its exports. Fourth, some of the conditionality demanded
during the accession process—particularly on the liberalization of domestic energy
prices—has been widely unpopular because of the perceived economic and social
consequences inside Russia. Finally, there has been a determined opposition to
WTO entry from some sectoral lobbies, as well as from the ideological opponents
of “economic liberalism.”
The advocates of WTO accession have not been short on counterarguments.
They point to gains from trade liberalization as largely accruing to WTO members,
benefiting nonmembers much less. Importantly, some of the effects of WTO mem-
bership may not be explicitly embedded in the lower tariff levels but concern
intangibles (such as access to the dispute settlement body of the WTO) that are
important for establishing a level playing field with WTO members. Thus, Russia’s
outsider status not only deprives it of automatic MFN treatment but also of the
option of defending its interests through the institutional framework of the WTO.
Another counterargument is that the possible short-term losses from import com-
petition may be manageable in light of longer-term efficiency gains. The latter
would likewise result from the level playing field facilitated by appropriate pro-
market structural reforms and by constraints on vested interests.
While WTO accession has proved to be a bone of contention, there is a rela-
tive dearth of quantitative evidence to help resolve or anchor this debate. Russia’s
accession to the WTO has been the subject of a number of studies, but they have
had fairly disparate frameworks and the results have varied. The more compre-
hensive studies have generally focused on the output implications of accession.
For example, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the National Investment Council
(RAS, 2002) used an input-output model to explore the consequences of acces-
sion-related reductions in import duties for sectoral and regional output dynamics.
The overall output effect was estimated at 1 percent of GDP. Another study by
Tarr, Jensen, and Rutherford (2002) employed a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model, which, in addition to changes in import duties, also estimated the
effects of foreign investment and concluded that the latter was likely to account for
up to 70 percent of Russia’s benefits from WTO accession. On this basis, GDP
gains were estimated to range from 3 percent in the medium term to about 25 per-
cent in the longer term.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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A major underlying problem with these estimates has been the lack of a rea-
sonably comprehensive projection of the effect of accession on Russia’s exports,
which may be of primary importance both for the derivation of the output effects
and in its own right. Alekseev, Tourdyeva, and Yudaeva (2003) briefly explore this
issue in a CGE model, with the assumption that Russia’s export competitiveness
would be enhanced with lower import duties. Their study yields a broad-based but
very modest estimate of a 0.9 percent export expansion. However, the calculation
disregards the likelihood that Russia’s exports may already be constrained as a con-
sequence of nonmembership. Berglöf and others (2003) put this shortfall at $3 bil-
lion, or about 3 percent of Russia’s total exports, based on an assessment of actual
restrictions on Russian exports across sectors. Still, one may argue that this effect
could be very different in the longer term, as the economy adjusts to the improved
market access. We know of no studies that explore such a general equilibrium
effect within a model of Russia’s external trade, and we intend to fill that gap in
what follows.5
II. Econometric Specification and Data
Model
The gravity model has been one of the notable successes in empirical economics
(see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Its applications have by now become stan-
dard for the evaluation of various issues in trade, migration, investment, currency
unions, and so on. In particular, it has served as both an alternative and a comple-
ment to the CGE models (Greenaway and Milner, 2002). It has recently been used
to assess the effect of the WTO on multilateral trade patterns, notably by Rose
(2002) and Subramanian and Wei (2003), who evaluated the sign and magnitude of
the “WTO dummy” after controlling for the customary gravity effects. We will
employ a Russia-centered gravity model to evaluate Russia’s trade determinants
and patterns, with particular attention to the role of the WTO.6
The standard gravity model specification relates total trade turnover or exports/
imports as a dependent variable to distance and GDP as independent variables.
Most such models also include additional independent variables, such as popula-
tion, GDP per capita, and dummy variables denoting borders, islands, and former
colonies, as well as membership in free trade areas (FTAs), currency unions, and
so on. Our basic model is given by
Ln( ) ln ln ln XD Y Yy y
USSR
it i rt it rt it = () +∗ () +∗ ()
+ i ii i i it it COMECON EAEC BORDER WTO ++ + + + µ ,( ) 1
5Dean and Eremenko (2003) used gravity model simulations for Ukraine, concluding that there would
be no measurable improvement of its market access in the event of WTO accession. However, their model
did not explicitly include a WTO-related variable.
6The gravity model has already been used for Russia and the former Soviet Union in several studies,
notably by Gros and Steinherr (1995) and van Selm (1997). That research pointed to the high predictive
power of the model with respect to the intra-Soviet trade flows.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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where X stands for Russia’s exports to country i at time t; D is the distance
between Russia and country i; the subsequent two terms denote the products of
Russia’s and the partner’s GDPs and GDPs per capita, respectively; USSR and
COMECON are dummy variables denoting the partner country’s former status as
a Soviet republic or a former member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assis-
tance; EAEC stands for the countries forming the Eurasian Economic Community;
and BORDER denotes the existence of a common border with Russia. The inclu-
sion of these variables allows us to control for as many natural causes of trade as
possible and search for effects of the WTO dummy variable (reflecting the partner
country’s membership in the WTO) on the residual. To check the robustness of the
basic results, more independent variables common to the literature will be added
to the basic regression; in particular, those reflecting trade regimes and restrictions
(i.e., tariffs and the GSP), as well as those pertaining to country and sectoral asym-
metries, identified by Subramanian and Wei (2003) as important for assessing the
general impact of the WTO on trade.
We define distances between Russia and its trading partners as the “great cir-
cle” between Moscow and the respective capitals of the partner countries. Given
Russia’s size, there may be a problem with this definition; for example, Morocco is
deemed closer to Russia than China is, even though Russia shares an extensive bor-
der with the latter. Gros and Steinherr (1995) resolved this problem by splitting
Russia’s economic space into several macroregions, whose distances to Russia’s
trading partners were estimated separately. In what follows, we confine ourselves
to adding a dummy variable for bordering countries, which in part addresses the
distortion of distance measurement. We believe that our capital-distance-corrected-
for-border approach may be much more reasonable than the alternative (smallest
distance between the borders), given that much of Russia’s economic potential is
heavily concentrated in the European part of the country, of which Moscow is the
approximate center.
Regarding global trading arrangements, our analysis focuses narrowly on 
the role of the WTO proper, leaving the effects of its predecessor—the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—outside the scope of this study. This is
largely because the WTO was created only three years after Russia’s independence
and about the time when Russia’s trade flows were beginning to be guided mostly
by market forces. There are also important differences between the WTO and the
GATT that may rationalize their separate treatment in empirical studies (although
much of the existing empirical literature has ignored them): (1) the WTO is an inter-
governmental organization (while the GATT was essentially a set of rules) with an
institutional framework and a greater role of multilateral agreements, (2) the WTO
dispute settlement system appears to be significantly more efficient than the system
under the GATT, and (3) the WTO has a much wider coverage of trade issues.
Our specification of the gravity model differs in several ways from that of
most models employed in the related literature, reflecting the particular aims and
constraints of our exercise. First, we confine the data set to the post-Soviet period
of 1995–2002, thereby skipping the statistical chaos in the Russian export series
of the early 1990s. However, this comes at the cost of significantly reducing the
number of periods for time-series analysis. Second, the model investigates onlyBogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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Russia’s pairwise trade with other countries, as opposed to the multilateral setup of
most gravity models. This country-centered specification of the gravity model is
not unusual (see Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003) and allows us to focus on idiosyncratic
patterns of Russia’s foreign trade through a more precise modeling of the country-
specific parameters. However, we should be cautious about generalizing some of
our conclusions on the effects of WTO membership, since Russia’s specific char-
acteristics may impart a bias or complicate the interpretation of the WTO variable.
Data
While existing data sets on the gravity model (most notably that of Andrew Rose,
posted on his website—see Rose, 2005) served as a guide, the bulk of the data
have been compiled from various sources. The data set spans a period of eight
years from 1995 to 2002 and encompasses 171 countries, most of which are WTO
members, including the recent entrants (see Table 3). In order to account for data
imperfections in the course of the sensitivity analysis, five countries were excluded
for reasons of likely measurement error and incomplete observations.7 The exact
definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix Table A.2. The data on
exports are derived from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, with the occa-
sional gaps covered by Russia’s customs statistics. The sectoral dummy variables
(for the metals and oil sectors) were derived with the help of data from the
Customs Committee of the Russian Federation. The information on world popu-
lation was obtained from the United Nations and from the U.S. Census Bureau.
GDP figures across countries are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
(WEO) database. The data on distances from world capitals to Moscow were
derived from computer software that is readily available on the website of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. All regressions were performed using Stata 8.0.
As recognized by Rose (2002), the data on the GSP are imperfect, although
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been
making an effort to compile and update the data on the beneficiaries of GSP reg-
ularly. One such database posted on the official UNCTAD website8 contains a list
of countries that granted Russia GSP status as of June 1, 2001. Of the 19 countries
that have accorded GSP status to Russia, 15 are members of the European Union;
the 4 remaining countries are Canada, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
and the United States.
Data on Russia’s exports in 1995–2002 exhibit significant volatility across
time, with exports to some countries in Africa and Latin America emerging only
toward the second half of the period. Owing to the conversion of exports into nat-
ural logarithms, the observations denoting zero exports to trading partners were
treated as missing by Stata, thereby significantly reducing the overall number of
observations in the panel data set. To check for this problem, we also transform the
7Including the estimates for these countries and territories (Bermuda, Cuba, Iraq, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, and Serbia and Montenegro) does not alter the statistical significance of the results or
their qualitative nature.
8See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1418&lang=1.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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underlying data in various ways: by adding 1 to the number under the logarithm,
by assigning negligible values to the missing observations, or by averaging obser-
vations across periods. As reported below, these changes did not have a significant
effect on the basic regression results.
III. Econometric Results
To shed light on the factors behind Russia’s export performance, we run several
sets of gravity model regressions. We also explore various modifications to the
underlying model to check the robustness of our results.
Cross-Section Regressions
Table 4 presents the main cross-section results, which are tabulated as sequential
independent regressions with each of the year-specific WTO dummies for the
1995–2002 period. The outcomes appear reassuring. The gravity model seems to
fit Russia’s export data quite well, as can be seen from the high R-squared, aver-
aging some 70 percent across the regressions for different years. Distance and out-
put coefficients are all significant, with signs and magnitude similar to those of
other applied gravity models. In particular, the coefficient on distance is generally
slightly lower than −1, while the sum of coefficients on output and output per
capita is close to unity. The former Soviet Union and COMECON dummy vari-
ables are also highly positive and significant. The dummies for common border
countries and the EAEC also are of the right sign but are generally not significant,
at 5–10 percent levels.
Interestingly, the WTO coefficient is always negative, although in most cases
(with the exception of 1996) it is statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level.
At the same time, the coefficient is close to being significant at the 10 percent level
for most years, while truly negligible only for 1998 data. However, 1998 was the
year of severe macroeconomic crisis in Russia and thus could possibly reflect
Table 3. Annual Increase in WTO Membership, 1995–2002
Members as of January 1, 1995 76
1995 112*
1996 16
1997 4 (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of
Congo, Mongolia, Panama)
1998 1 (Kyrgyz Republic)
1999 2 (Estonia, Latvia)
2000 5 (Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Oman)
2001 3 (Moldova, China, Lithuania)
2002 1 (Taiwan Province of China)
Total WTO members as of end-2002 144
Source: WTO.
*Includes countries that became members of the WTO as of January 1, 1995.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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some specific factors. The persistently negative sign on the WTO dummy basically
means that, after controlling for the gravity factors, Russia systematically tended
to export more to non-WTO countries than to WTO countries.
To even out year-specific idiosyncrasies, we run a cross-section regression on
the anual means of the model’s variables (last two columns of Table 4). These
“core” regressions include the dummy variables reflecting WTO membership at
end-1995 and at end-1996, the last year when changes in membership took place
on a significant scale. The basic “gravity” coefficients on distance and total GDP
continue to be highly significant and appropriate in sign and magnitude, as are
the dummies on the former Soviet Union and COMECON. The WTO dummy
becomes statistically significant and numerically larger, whereas those that denote
the customs union and the Russia-bordering countries do not, possibly because their
effect is already captured by the strongly significant variable reflecting the role of
the former Soviet Union.
The results of the regressions on annual means hold for exports as the depen-
dent variable in the regression but also for the overall trade turnover. The WTO
Table 4. Cross-Country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions, 1995–2002
(Regressand: Russia’s exports; standard errors below)
Annual Means
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 WTO-95 WTO-96
WTO −0.55 −1.19 −0.45 0.00 −0.55 −0.55 −0.54 −0.54 −0.76 −0.98
0.38 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.43 0.32 0.34
Log distance −0.98 −1.22 −0.96 −1.01 −0.96 −1.35 −1.35 −1.63 −1.38 −1.34
0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.24
Log product 0.72 0.75 0.65 0.64 0.84 0.88 0.91 1.02 1.00 0.99
real GDP 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07
Log product 
real per 0.11 0.38 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.07 −0.01 0.14 0.15
capita GDP  0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.10
Common 0.11 0.23 0.40 0.39 0.59 0.44 0.56 0.30 0.23 0.18
border 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.58 0.51 0.53 0.69 0.60 0.60
USSR 2.01 1.82 2.17 1.91 1.93 1.51 1.77 1.80 2.13 2.00
0.62 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.70 0.62 0.63 0.82 0.72 0.72
COMECON1 2.14 2.66 2.62 2.00 2.36 2.22 2.18 1.98 2.22 2.30
0.50 0.49 0.52 0.43 0.62 0.54 0.56 0.73 0.61 0.60
EAEC 0.89 0.95 0.73 0.89 0.96 1.20 1.06 0.94 1.10 1.09
0.76 0.76 0.80 0.69 1.00 0.88 0.91 1.20 1.04 1.03
Constant 5.93 7.06 5.65 6.42 4.70 7.74 7.04 8.51 6.18 6.10
1.89 1.89 1.94 1.61 2.21 1.93 2.01 2.67 2.29 2.27
R-squared 0.62 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.77
Number of
observations 92 103 117 123 153 153 146 155 168 168
F-test 16.97 35.23 31.39 45 40.19 57.6 53.5 40.97 63.86 65.12
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1For COMECON see footnote to Table 1.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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coefficient remains statistically significant and negative in all those regressions.
The absolute value of the distance coefficient is smaller than with exports as the
dependent variable, whereas the opposite is true for the GDP coefficient.
Additionally, the results were robust to different gravity model specifications
(Linnemann, 1966; Bergstrand, 1985; and Wang and Winters, 1992), some of
which included single-country population and GDP variables separately (instead
of per capita GDP or a product of country-pair GDPs). In all such specifications,
the statistical significance of the negative WTO coefficient remained largely intact.
Pooled Regressions
Despite their widespread use in the academic literature, cross-section gravity regres-
sions have a number of limitations compared with full-fledged panel data regres-
sions. First, they entail a loss in the number of observations that could be used in the
regression, thereby possibly affecting the robustness of the results. Second, they dis-
regard time variation in the data and thus may result in inconsistent estimates
(Matyas, 1997). Third, they do not fully answer some policy questions of interest;
for example, regarding (1) any effects of the model on the direction of change in
trade flows or (2) a trade effect of a Russian partner country’s joining the WTO.
As a further step, ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled regressions were per-
formed on all of the observations of the data set for 1995–2002. Compared with
the cross-section regressions, the WTO dummy becomes time varying, so instead
of the period-specific WTO dummies, we construct a single WTO dummy variable.
The results (see first column of Table 5) do not appear to differ much from those of
cross-section regressions, with the WTO coefficient negative and statistically sig-
nificant. Also, the customs union and border dummies become statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level, which is to be expected with the large increase in
the number of observations.
This pooled regression was tested through several robustness checks, none of
which mattered for the basic results, including the WTO variable. To account for
the possible correlation of country observations over time, we also used robust
standard errors (column 2 of Table 5). We also experimented with the inclusion or
exclusion of alternative country-specific observations (columns 3–6 and 8), as well
as with the quadratic gravity term (column 7).
In sum, the pooled regressions confirm the results of cross-section data but do
not appear to add much new qualitative insight. This may indicate that the main
driving force for the results is heterogeneity across countries. However, while
pooled regressions appear to reinforce cross-sectional results (including on the role
of the WTO), this method imposes identical coefficients across countries and thus
may induce misspecification. A more sophisticated framework would be helpful to
check the robustness of the results, including by disentangling the time-invariant
and country-specific effects.
Time, Fixed, and Other Effects
Table 6 presents panel data regressions with time effects. The results remain very
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checks, with the WTO coefficient continuing to be significantly negative through-
out. In addition to the robustness checks shown in Table 5, we test (in the second
column of Table 6) the significance of GSP preferences and of the asymmetry
between Russia’s exports to the developed and developing economies (through a
developed-country dummy). Whereas the WTO coefficient is not affected by these
additions, the latter modifications enter with statistically significant coefficients.
In particular, the sign on the developed-country dummy is negative, indicating that
for some reason Russia’s exports to developed countries were “limited” compared
with those to other countries, all other things being equal. The sign on the GSP
dummy is, as expected, positive.
Table 7 presents augmented robustness checks to the time effects regressions,
which do not affect the negative sign of the WTO variable. These include a number
of additional controls common in the gravity model literature, such as islands, land-
locked areas, the size of the country, and import duties. Additionally, country and
sectoral asymmetries are tested, including by dummies for nations that import oil
Table 6. Regressions with Time Effects, 1995–2002
(Regressand: Russia’s exports; standard errors below.
Coefficients for distance, GDP , and GDP per capita not reported.)
Excluding
Over Excluding Quadratic Outliers
All $0.5 Poor Data Gravity of over
Simple Simple Countries* Million Countries** Term 2 sd
WTO −0.54 −0.51 −0.44 −0.47 −0.41 −0.52 −0.47
0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11
USSR 1.92 1.91 2.02 1.67 1.95 1.98 1.73
0.23 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.19
COMECON 2.30 2.10 2.40 2.13 2.23 2.39 2.16
0.20 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.17
EAEC 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.89 0.95






Constant 6.55 6.24 6.23 7.06 6.92 2.83 6.90
0.73 0.76 0.58 0.61 0.76 7.05 0.62
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.75
Number of
observations 1,042 1,042 1,366 992 1,006 1,042 1,007
F-test 310.83 252.85 665.4 343.65 319.25 229.29 360.13
Source: Authors’ calculations.
*Logarithmic transformation on the dependent variable: log(x+1).
**Excluding Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Serbia and Montenegro, Iraq, Bermuda,
and Cuba.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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and steel from Russia. Accounting for these specificities may be important, given the
somewhat skewed structure of Russia’s exports of those products and because of
pronounced trade idiosyncrasies in those sectors (i.e., large trade restrictions for
steel). Incidentally, both the oil and steel dummies have large, positive, and signifi-
cant coefficients. Finally, a variable, GATT-94, has been included to measure the
impact for those countries that were the founders of the WTO, since they could be
seen as a core group of economies with a long-term commitment to multilateral
trade liberalization. Interestingly, the coefficient on this term is significantly nega-
tive, and its inclusion does not have much impact on the coefficient of the broader
Table 7. Robustness Checks, 1995–2002
(Time effects, unless otherwise noted. Regressand:
Russia’s exports; standard errors below.)
12345 6 7 *
WTO −0.57 −0.41 −0.41 −0.43 −0.40 −0.35 0.20
0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.19
USSR 1.97 1.98 2.00 1.17 1.31 0.94
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.34
COMECON 2.39 2.37 2.25 1.96 2.21 1.70
0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28
EAEC 1.29 1.30 1.26 1.11 0.96 1.27
0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.38
Landlocked −0.28 −0.26 −0.25 −0.29 −0.39 −0.46
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16
Island −0.10 −0.10 0.01 −0.16 0.05 −0.36
0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.22
Log area −0.25 −0.26 −0.24 −0.20 −0.20 −0.21
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
GSP 0.55 0.16 0.84 0.12
0.24 0.24 0.23 0.29
Developed economy −0.43 −0.50 −0.86 −0.64







GATT-94 −0.32 −0.33 −0.21 −0.32 −0.14
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15
Constant 8.13 7.89 7.42 7.09 7.45 7.76 31.70
0.77 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.78 1.03 6.41
R-squared: overall 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.92
Number of observations 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 795 1,042
F-test 242.39 223.83 192.92 189.79 190.56 145.00 58.19
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Coefficients for distance, GDP, and GDP per capita not reported.
*Fixed-effects regression with country dummies included.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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WTO variable.9 In addition, we have run several regressions by adding a lagged
dependent variable, which have also yielded a negative WTO coefficient, although
more weakly significant (at 5–20 percent, depending on the exact specification).
We also attempted to infer from time variation in the data, although this exer-
cise was somewhat limited by modeling and data problems. The last column of
Table 7 contains estimates of a country fixed-effects regression10 with country-
specific dummies (with standard adjustments to avoid the overidentification prob-
lem). In such regressions, all time-invariant variables (distance and most regional
and country dummies) are effectively subsumed into the constant term, thereby
exploiting only the variation among four variables: total and per capita GDP,
WTO, and exports. The regression essentially addresses a “within” question: What
does joining the WTO do to a country’s imports from Russia? The positive (albeit
not significant at the 10 percent level) coefficient on the WTO dummy weakly sug-
gests, in line with intuition, that the countries that joined the WTO over the sam-
ple period actually favored Russian exports at the margin. However, this result has
to be taken with caution, because (1) the time period of analysis is short and the
number of observations fairly small; and (2) important “control” variables
(regional dummies) and the distance variable drop out from the analysis, which
may modify the relationship within this “aborted” gravity model.
IV. Discussion of Results
The main result is that within a well-fitting gravity model for Russia, the WTO
coefficient is negative and statistically significant in the baseline cross-section and
most panel data regressions. On this basis, the structure of Russia’s trade remains
in some sense “suboptimal” or “different” compared with the benchmark offered
by the gravity model, in that it trades “too little” with the WTO members and/or
“too much” with non-WTO members. This may not seem surprising, given that a
good portion (but by no means all) of non-WTO members are former socialist
economies, with significant historical and systemic ties with Russia. However, these
results are somewhat surprising, since we control for these specificities through
various regional dummy variables, which are themselves intuitive, with large coef-
ficients, and highly significant.
This basic result applies to the 1995–2002 period on average but does not yet
indicate how this bias evolved over time. First, judging from Table 4, the WTO
coefficient in independent cross-section regressions was negative, albeit volatile,
in 1996–98 and stabilizing within a remarkably narrow range around −0.55 in
1999–2002. This indicates that the extent of anti-WTO trade bias appeared to be
9A “between-effects” panel estimation yielded an even larger absolute estimate of the WTO coeffi-
cient, in the range of minus 0.7 to minus 0.9, with the coefficient being robustly statistically significant.
Otherwise, results were similar to those of the time effects regression.
10A random-effects regression seems less appropriate, given that its underlying assumption—that
unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the included variables—seems somewhat heroic
in the case of our model (for example, heterogeneity with respect to the GDP variable). In any case, the
results from the random-effects regression showed a negative coefficient on the WTO variable, albeit small
and insignificant.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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roughly constant over the sample period. Second, the fixed-effects regression with
country-specific dummies actually suggests that Russia’s trade with the WTO was
encouraged at the margin, since some 30 countries that joined the WTO after 1995
tended to favor Russian exports, all other things being equal (Table 3). This may be
a consequence of the general trade-liberalizing measures that these countries under-
took in the process of WTO accession and thus may be consistent with the overall
WTO positive spillover effect found by Subramanian and Wei (2003). Still, our
regressions show only a limited “within” effect during 1995–2002 and thus do not
reject the possibility of a “trap” or some persistence of an anti-WTO equilibrium.
In sum, the highlighted bias concerns the trade structure in terms of levels,
while the evidence on the direction of change is largely inconclusive. Numerically,
the value of the WTO coefficient in most regressions suggests that, in the long run,
Russia exports on average at least one-third less [exp(−0.4) − 1] to members of the
WTO than to all of its trading partners. These are very large estimates, implying
potentially huge trade costs of nonmembership in the WTO, subject to a number
of qualifications, which will be investigated below.
Factors Behind the Regression Results
Why does the structure of Russia’s trade differ from that suggested by the gravity
model? Clearly, various factors could account for Russia’s particular trading pat-
tern, ranging from statistical and historical reasons to more substantive economic
and policy issues. We briefly review key arguments below; more details can be
found in Lissovolik and Lissovolik (2004).
First, Russia’s exports may be constrained by restrictions imposed by its
WTO trading partners, either because these do not enjoy the full benefits from
the trade liberalization rounds, or owing to barriers—formal or informal—levied
by individual WTO members. WTO member countries may impose these barri-
ers on nonmembers more readily than on members, because the former cannot
retaliate, because they do not belong to the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies, or
for other reasons.
To  gauge the influence of trade barriers on our regression results, we have
included a separate GSP term in the regressions (Table 7); it carries the expected
positive sign, but has only a marginal impact on the significance of the WTO sign.
In addition, we have controlled for the level of explicit import duties (Table 7); the
sign is, as expected, negative, but the economic and statistical significance of the
coefficient is marginal. These weak results are not surprising, given that dummies
are only rough proxies for policies, but this may also suggest a role for “implicit”
and “microlevel” restrictions, such as antidumping actions, or the probability of
recourse to them.
Regarding the sensitivity of our results to these de facto restrictions (includ-
ing implicit trade barriers), we introduced sectoral dummies within the regressions
(Table 7), focusing on two benchmark export commodities that are starkly differ-
ent from the point of view of trade restrictions: steel and oil. As expected, both
dummies appear highly significant and have positive coefficients. A steel importer
dummy, which controls for a sector in which trade restrictions (explicit and implicit)RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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are prevalent, reduces the size of the coefficient on the WTO variable; while an oil
importer dummy—with no perceptible trade restrictions on the part of importers—
increases the absolute size of the negative coefficient.11 These results suggest a
positive link between the anti-WTO bias and restrictions on Russia’s exports.
However, the evidence is only suggestive, since the changes in the WTO coeffi-
cient are fairly small.
Second, the export pattern may have been influenced by Russia’s domestic
export restrictions. While most of Russia’s export duties were gradually dropped by
mid-1996, some duties were introduced or reintroduced in 1999–2000. There is at
least some evidence pointing to the role of these domestic export restrictions in gen-
erating the gravity model’s negative WTO coefficient. In the cross-section results of
Table 4, the significance of the WTO variable becomes much lower in 1997 and
essentially breaks down in 1998, when domestic export restrictions were minimal.12
Third, the negative sign on the WTO variable may be connected to Russia’s
excessively good bargaining position vis-à-vis some non-WTO members, which
may be labeled as “relatively small and dependent economies.” However, the coef-
ficient on the real GDP in the regressions is positive and—at just below unity—
consistent with those from other gravity model applications. This, all other things
being equal, suggests that there is nothing special in Russia’s trade with smaller
countries.
Fourth, despite its good fit, the gravity model is susceptible to specification
problems. These may include (1) insufficient control for multilateral resistance
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003); (2) endogeneity bias (countries with sub-
stantial trade with Russia are less interested in WTO entry); (3) simultaneity bias
(political preferences or other factors pushing some countries toward Russia and
away from the WTO at the same time); and (4) omitted variables that tilt Russia’s
trade toward particular countries (including insufficient quality of Russia’s manu-
facturing products). We explored these issues to some extent in Lissovolik and
Lissovolik (2004) and found no clear evidence of these problems, either on eco-
nomic or statistical grounds. For example, the GATT-94 coefficient that controls
for the established WTO members (and is not affected by endogeneity) is signifi-
cantly negative in all specifications of the gravity model.
We also have checked the sensitivity of our results to country groupings more
generally. Thus, industrial countries—all of which were WTO members during
the sample period—appear to be particularly nonreceptive to Russia’s exports. As
we can see from Table 7, a dummy for those countries is significant in most of our
benchmark regressions, and always with a negative sign. If we split the WTO
dummy into developed- and developing-country dummies, the developed-country
dummy has a larger absolute value of almost −1.1, compared with the developing
country WTO dummy of −0.55, with both being significant. Regarding the sensi-
11Oil, with the role of pipeline infrastructure in generating export inertia, may not be a perfect exam-
ple, but a fair portion of Russia’s oil exports (by sea) can be redirected at the margin.
12At the same time, there could be an alternative explanation based on our first hypothesis (WTO
countries’ restrictions on Russia’s exports). Russia’s declining export performance in 1997–98 may have
been caused by the concurrent global crisis, with some preset import restrictions becoming less binding
because of the contraction in world trade.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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tivity of the regression results to individual country observations, we compared
leverage against normalized squared residuals for cross-section regressions on annual
means that were reported in the last two columns of Table 4. The leverage mea-
sure indicates the extent to which an observation is influential for the regres-
sion results, while greater residuals denote outliers. Observations high in leverage
(Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, etc.) are not the ones that are large outliers (Gabon,
Botswana, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Excluding the most
important outliers or leveraged observations does not alter the results with respect
to the sign and the significance of the WTO dummy (Table 8).
This list of reasons is by no means exhaustive. Still, the model’s outcomes and
manipulations lend some credence to the link between export restrictions, both
from outside and within Russia, and the “anti-WTO tilt” in Russia’s trade. In any
case, the combination of the “overall” and “within” results reinforces a lack of
broader evidence that established WTO members have been as receptive as others
to Russia’s exports.
Implications for Russia’s WTO Accession
Assuming that the gravity model results can proxy Russia’s export structure fol-
lowing its WTO entry, one may project Russia’s putative trade developments in a
“postentry” world. The numerical coefficients in our regressions imply that, in the
long run, Russia’s exports to WTO members could expand by a very large amount—
Table 8. OLS Cross-Country Regression on Annual Means, 1995–2002
(Coefficients on constant and border not reported)
Without Outliers* Without High-Leverage Observations**
Number of observations 160 164
F (8, 151) 101.90 70.41
Prob >F 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.75
Exports (dep. var.) Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
WTO96 −1.16 0.28 −0.97 0.35
EAEC 1.10 0.80 — —
COMECON 2.20 0.47 2.28 0.61
USSR 1.82 0.56 1.95 0.73
GDP per capita 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.10
Distance −1.30 0.19 −1.35 0.25
GDP 0.98 0.06 0.99 0.07
Source: Authors’ calculations.
*On the basis of the “leverage vs. squared residuals” plot, outliers were identified as including
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Bahrain, Cape Verde, Botswana, Gabon, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Oman, and Liberia.
**On the basis of the “leverage vs. squared residuals” plot, high-leverage observations were
identified as including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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according to most regressions, by around 50 percent.13 A major issue is the extent
to which this correction of trade diversion would occur through export expansion
as opposed to reorientation. In the latter case, there would be a substitution effect,
and a smaller increase in Russia’s exports to the WTO countries would suffice
to align its export structure. In all likelihood, both the expansion and substitution
effects would be present, but a precise configuration could not be modeled without
a more detailed structure. Generically, though, there has to be some export expan-
sion. In particular, if the economic reasons for our underlying results are trade
restrictions of any type, it is unlikely that the trade-off between exportables and
nontraded goods would be unaffected after the restrictions on exports have been
relaxed.
In any case, our estimates indicate an asymptotic upper bound of the long-run
effect. In the short run, the WTO-related export expansion may be further limited,
given the evidence that, in some key export-oriented sectors (such as metals),
Russia’s capacity utilization rate has approached fairly high levels. In this situation,
a further export expansion hinges on substantial investment and could be delayed.
Another caveat with respect to future projections is our narrow interpretation of
the WTO membership dummy as the main causal channel in the model. The WTO
variable may be proxying other factors than membership; for example, Russia’s
recognition as a market economy for antidumping purposes. Russia obtained this
status with most major countries by late 2002, without becoming a WTO member.
Thus, the magnitude of the WTO dummy should be interpreted not so much as a
precise elasticity but more as an indication of the role of this broad channel. Note
that with our data set ending in 2002, the market status argument could not be
checked directly.
Implications for WTO-Related Multilateral Studies
In what way can the negative WTO result for Russia be generalized? The appar-
ent persistence of an anti-WTO bias in Russia’s trade structure may call into ques-
tion the WTO’s trade-promoting role and relevance, including the spillover effects
emphasized by Subramanian and Wei (2003). But this reasoning leads to an uneasy
puzzle, since WTO membership in general and for particular countries is consid-
ered important, not only in academic and public circles but also in practical nego-
tiations, decisions, and outcomes.14 We believe that our results point to why the
WTO may be relevant. While our analysis cannot prove or disprove the insights of
Rose (2004), it suggests that the situation may be more complex and that focusing
on averages may be insufficient for understanding the WTO’s exact role and the
associated policy issues.
In particular, we would argue that three asymmetries (in addition to those
emphasized by Subramanian and Wei, 2003) may be important in generalizing
13Our baseline assumption is that, in the long run, the gravity model coefficient on the WTO would
approximate zero, which is roughly consistent with the multilateral results of Rose (2004).
14The recent debates on the WTO’s role in job outsourcing in industrialized countries and China’s
export expansion are cases in point.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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insights from our results. First, the asymmetry between members and nonmembers
should be studied more carefully. Our negative WTO result for Russia’s trade pat-
tern may crucially depend on Russia being a nonmember country. It is thus possi-
ble that a strong anti-WTO bias for some country combinations is (largely) offset
by pro-WTO results for other combinations, even if one controls for the usual
gravity factors.
The second type of asymmetry is between the policy response to larger and
smaller countries, as it may be quite logical that larger countries like China or
Russia may be generating more concern over their export potential and, hence,
may face more restrictions from third countries. This may explain why our Russia-
centered results are more significant than Rose’s (2004) multilateral average for
nonmembers.
Third, there are asymmetries based on political and systemic alliances that affect
WTO members and nonmembers differently and at the same time influence the
direction of trade. As an example, a stark division of the world into (pro-)socialist
(largely non-WTO) and capitalist (largely WTO) camps for much of the postwar
period may substantially bias the results of the long-term models and may have
contributed to the emergence of localized centers of gravity. These issues may not
be fully accounted for in gravity models, and a country-centered model seems bet-
ter suited than multilateral gravity models to include essential policy-cum-political
dummies. For this purpose, the role of country-specific fixed-effects results
becomes more important, and the results are more positive for the WTO’s trade-
promoting role both in the multilateral and the Russia-centered framework.15
Interestingly, our evidence on the specific asymmetry between developed and
developing countries emphasized by Subramanian and Wei (2003) differs from
that of the authors. While they linked the lack of trade openness within the WTO
to developing countries, Russia’s exports to the industrialized WTO members
appeared to be disadvantaged to the same or even greater extent than those to
developing WTO countries. This in part reflects our “within” result that Russian
exports seemed to benefit (albeit slightly) from trade liberalization of new WTO
members, all of which were either developing or transition countries. Thus, our
results imply that WTO membership may be particularly important for access to
developed country markets by current nonmembers.16
More generally, our results point to the possibility of a domino effect in the
expansion of WTO membership that is akin to the similar effect estimated in the
operation of regional trade arrangements (RTAs) (see Sapir, 2001). The driving
force behind the operation of the domino effect is the costs of nonmembership,
which are countered by applying for membership in an RTA. As in any RTA,
15Still, the evidence for a positive WTO impact in fixed-effects regressions is fairly weak, partly
because the coefficient captures a shorter-run “within” effect, as opposed to the longer-run “between”
effect of the OLS regressions.
16This conclusion would run counter to Rose’s (2004) point that developed WTO country members
indiscriminately extend trading preferences to nonmembers; instead, it would support a study by UNCTAD
(2004) arguing that the world’s poorest countries are receiving only limited benefits from preferential trade
schemes designed to help them, because of gaps in coverage and restrictive rules of origin.RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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incomplete WTO membership creates a wedge between members and nonmem-
bers that may turn out to be costly for the latter.
In sum, we are more comfortable with this complex view, which also goes
some way toward explaining the WTO “irrelevance puzzle.” Thus, the WTO
appears relevant and may have inner trade-promoting features that appear to aver-
age out in the simple gravity comparisons. At the same time, we would not want
to be too categorical on this point, since Russia’s specific circumstances as a non-
member and the short period of analysis weaken comparability with the long-term
multilateral studies.
V. Concluding Remarks
We show that Russia’s export structure, after controlling for gravity effects and
several country- and region-specific factors, was tilted significantly away from
WTO members in 1995–2002. The evidence of trade reorientation toward the pre-
dicted pattern during the same period is quite weak, as it affects only new WTO
members and does not apply to Russia’s exports to advanced economies. We rea-
son that these results may be at least partially related to the external and possibly
domestic constraints on Russia’s exports, which, in turn, depend on Russia’s con-
tinued nonmembership in the WTO. This would suggest that Russia’s WTO acces-
sion may redirect and/or expand Russia’s exports substantially, although possibly
only in the very long term. While it cannot be fully ruled out that Russia’s histor-
ical, cultural, or other idiosyncratic factors may bias our results, various methods
and controls for most country- and region-specific observable effects did not elim-
inate the significance of the negative influence of the WTO variable.
Our findings are related to two strands of WTO-related research: global and
Russia-specific. Globally, this is an interesting case study within a general debate
between Rose (2002, 2004) and other authors on the extent of the WTO-induced
gains from trade. Our results suggest that the WTO impact is quite relevant but
likely combines trade promotion among members with some implicit trade fric-
tions between members and nonmembers, while nonmembers may have additional
reasons to trade with each other that cannot be captured by the gravity model. At
the same time, our analysis does not formally prove or disprove the multilateral
model insights, and further rigorous testing is required.
With respect to Russia-specific issues, our results suggest tangible long-term
trade gains for Russia from its WTO accession, not least because of the high-
lighted friction between members and nonmembers. Although the time profile of
Russia’s gains is uncertain, waiting to join the WTO is likely not an attractive
option, given the weak pace of the underlying reorientation to date. While gener-
alizations may be misleading, China’s early experience seems to (albeit casually)
confirm the WTO membership’s strong effect on exports.17 It also should be cau-
tioned that the empirical model is a simplification, in that it treats WTO accession
17In 2002–03, according to the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, China’s annual growth in exports
and net foreign direct investment was 27 percent and 14 percent, respectively, compared with correspond-
ing annual averages of 17 percent and 7 percent over the decade prior to its WTO entry.Bogdan Lissovolik and Yaroslav Lissovolik
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as a binary choice (accession or nonaccession), while the reality is more compli-
cated, as the effect of Russia’s WTO accession obviously depends on the outcome
of the negotiations.
Still, at the very least, we have shown that (1) there is an underlying bias in
Russia’s trade structure that may need to be addressed, and (2) entering the WTO
appears to be the most logical way to address it. Regarding current trade policy,
Russia should, through WTO membership, benefit from a stronger focus on ensur-
ing uniformity and a level playing field across regional trading patterns. The sheer
size and diversity of the country favor trade integration via WTO membership
rather than through regional arrangements. Also, Russia’s entry would make the
WTO nearly universal, thereby possibly giving a multilateral boost to global trade.
Table A.1. Chronology of Russia’s WTO Accession Process
Stages of Accession
Request for accession
Memorandum on the foreign trade regime to be
submitted to the working party
Questions and replies: Submission of the
memorandum followed by questions from the
members of the working party and answers
from Russia
Working party multilateral negotiations to
determine the general conditions of accession,
including commitments to observe WTO rules
and the length of transitional periods necessary
to ensure their implementation
Working party bilateral negotiations. Each
accession working party makes decisions by
consensus; thus, Russia must reach an agreement
with each member of the working party.
The accession package:
The results of the negotiations are reflected in
three documents that form the accession package:
—Report of the working party that contains a
summary of proceedings and conditions of entry.
—Protocol of accession. This document provides
all the general terms and conditions of membership,
including the areas of the administration of trade
regime, nondiscrimination, the use of nontariff
measures, and so on.
—Schedules of market access commitments in goods
and services that reflect the agreements reached
with the members of the working party.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on www.wto.ru.
1993
March 1994, May 2001, November 2001
June 1995, June 1996
20 meetings of the working party in
1995–2003
Agreements on market access concluded
with several countries, including with
the European Union in May 2004.
Draft working party reports
(March 2002, November 2002,
May 2003)RUSSIA AND THE WTO: THE “GRAVITY”OF OUTSIDER STATUS
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Natural logarithm of Russia’s annual exports in 1995–2002
deflated by U.S. CPI
Natural logarithm of Russia’s annual trade turnover in 1995–2002
deflated by U.S. CPI
Natural logarithm of the product of Russia’s GDP and that of
Russia’s trade partners in 1995–2002 deflated by U.S. CPI
Natural logarithm of the product of Russia’s GDP per capita and
that of Russia’s trade partners in 1995–2002 deflated by
U.S. CPI
Natural logarithm of the distance from Moscow to the capitals of
Russia’s trade partners
Dummy variable (1=former COMECON member (East Germany
excluded), 0=not a former member of COMECON)
Dummy variable (1=member of the WTO, 0=not a member of 
the WTO)
Dummy variable (1=former member of the USSR, 0=not a former
member of the USSR)
Dummy variable (1=member of EAEC, 0=not a member of EAEC)
Dummy variable (1=developed country, 0=developing country)
Dummy variable (1=trading partner accords GSP treatment to
Russia, 0=trading partner does not accord GSP treatment to
Russia)
Dummy variable (1=island country, 0=non-island country)
Dummy variable (1=landlocked country, 0=non-landlocked country)
Natural logarithm of the product of Russia’s area (in sq. km) and
that of Russia’s trade partners
Dummy variable (1=importer of oil from Russia in 1995, 0=all
other countries)
Dummy variable (1=importer of steel from Russia, 0=all other
countries)
Dummy variable (1=member of the WTO as of January 1, 1995;
0=all other countries)
Natural logarithm of the average import tariff in Russia’s trading
partners
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